This article is a contribution to the study of the decision- 
High-level Federal Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation: the Case of the Bolsa Família Program
(2016) 10 (3) e0008 -4/26 rules framed by elected officials become a matter of professional ranking and possibility; after all, orders can be interpreted differently (OLSEN, 2005) .
Philip Selznick (1943) and Michel Crozier (1964) introduced the elements of informality and the political power into the conception of the bureaucratic ideal by examining the efficacy of the ideal bureaucracy. For both authors, the bureaucracy is varied and heterogeneous. Its actions coexist with formal and informal structures, which are marked by power and personal relationships (SELZNICK, 1943) . Influenced by Herbert Simon's notion of limited rationality, Crozier (1964) suggests that an analysis of the bureaucracy must encompass each individual's or groups' rationality, as well as the influence of factors that affect human relations and limit rationality.
Queries on the existence of the ideal bureaucracy were reinforced by empirical studies, which did not support the assumption of a rigid separation between political and bureaucratic stakeholders. Aberbach et al. (1981, pp. 89-94) show how a hybrid performance in the formulation of public policies gradually replaced such dichotomy, resulting in the bureaucratization of politics and politicisation of the bureaucracy 2 . Hence, politicians develop technical arguments similar to those of bureaucrats, to discuss the distributional effects of policies, while bureaucrats negotiate technical projects in a manner similar to politicians (Idem, 1981, pp. 89-94) . In sum, both types of decisionmakers need to develop political and technical skills, although there are still differences in the performance and political role of each.
Bureaucrats and politicians act in different manners and timeframes, although both take part in the decision-making process. There are "visible" participants (such as the president, his high-level advisers, ministries, congress members, political parties, etc) and "invisible" participants (career bureaucrats, academics and civil servants working for the congress). Visible stakeholders define the agenda, whilst invisible ones have more leverage on the selection of alternatives (KINGDOM, 1995) .
This study departs from these theoretical assumptions and focuses instead on the strategies adopted by ministries and the high-level federal bureaucracy of the Brazilian government when formulating the PBF. More specifically, we focus on the strategies adopted by policy-makers placed in the highest position in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy: the ministers and the executive secretaries ("Special Nature" positions, or __________________________________________________________________________________________ 2 It is important to note that this study does not target regular bureaucrats, but high-level bureaucrats that take part on decision-making processes, also called "policy makers". There is a debate on the role of these high-level policymakers. Some authors argue that hybridism is a reality in these positions (ABERBACH et al., 1981; LOUREIRO and ABRUCIO, 1999) , while others see these positions as filled by public managers, who would have more autonomy than regular bureaucrats to define tools and the best techniques to reach the goals defined by the political core (BONIS and PACHECO, 2010) .
They would also be evaluated by the results achieved, defined previously in a contract.
This point of view also argues that such positions are an expression of the overcoming of the dualism between political and bureaucratic roles which results in the creation of a new and specific group with their own ethos (PACHECO, 2002) . However, the reality of Brazilian politics brings challenges to the full development of these managerial/direction positions, such as the free political appointment (D' ARAUJO, 2009, p. 16) . In this study, we adopt the position of Loureiro and Abrucio (1999) , who use the term "positions of direction in the Brazilian political-administrative system" (LOUREIRO and ABRUCIO, 1999, p. 86) and assume that direction positions are occupied by hybrid professionals, who are responsible for efficient management but also attend the political goals of the governmental agenda.
Policy-makers are usually affiliated with epistemic communities (HAAS, 1992) and policy communities (RHODES, 2006) , here understood as groups who share common perspectives about policies in general which go along with specific speeches and proposals selected among policy alternatives 4 . However, Haas (1992) and Rhodes (2006) do not envisage appointed officials as performing an active role in policy framing.
Based on these concepts, we adopt the term high-level federal bureaucracy, understood as those who are politically appointed for policy-making positions in the government, more specifically the ministers and executive secretaries 5 . Their function __________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 DAS positions levels 05 and 06 include the following: chief of staff, special advisor and subsecretaries, among others (D' ARAUJO, 2009, p. 21) . 4 More specifically, the epistemic community literature recognizes the existence of the advisor, who is a hybrid stakeholder without individual interest, while the policy community literature operates with a broad concept that includes all bureaucrats and political groups. 5 It is important to highlight that bureaucrats in the Superior Direction and Advisory positions levels 05 and 06 became important in more operational PBF decision-making processes after the demands a hybrid behaviour that combines political aims with an affiliation to specific groups involved with policy formulation.
In sum, our study is guided by the assumption that high-level bureaucrats play a relevant role in the formulation of public policies. Thus, as invisible actors, their performance is primarily directed at designing alternatives for policies included in the agenda by elected politicians. However, policy communities may be split into different groups that establish rational strategies to influence the formulation of public policies. So, unlike Haas (1992) and Rhodes (2006) , we assume that invisible actors take an active role in disputes over the design of public policies.
The decision-making process as a locus of power and uncertainty
When formulating public policies, decision-makers are limited by a set of either constitutional or legal rules. At the micro level, decision-makers set their strategies based on different preferences which are informed by values, personal background, and knowledge, which can all affect the way they understand a problem and frame its solutions.
Moreover, actors involved in policy decision-making seek to increase their power (LINDBLOM, 1980) . As a result, when taking part in a decision-making process, actors interact so as to influence and control each other. Lindblom (1980) named policy formulation as a "game of power", a concept that suggests a set of more complex and intimate interrelations than the terms "politics" or "interrelationship" (Idem, 1980, pp. 39-40) .
In the political realm, the framing of policies follows an incremental logic due to the uncertainty of the environment and the limited rationality of decision makers.
Moreover, organised political groups compete against each other by making use of different tools, including money, information, organisational capacity, and persuasion. As a result, models of decision making must take account of the complexity of such political processes, particularly by paying attention to the "competition of analyses" among policymakers, be they politicians or bureaucrats (LINDBLOM, 1980) .
__________________________________________________________________________________________
2003 decision to unify the conditional cash transfer programs. In addition, we highlight that the interviews in this study were carried out with people who were in these positions, who reported on the PBF and MDS creation. This study aims at unpacking such power games by identifying different groups, their technical-political projects and the result of their interaction in formulating the PBF.
Undertaking such a task is particularly complicated, as the political and technical dimensions of the dispute are usually jointly and implicitly present in actors' speeches.
Methodology
This study examines the PBF formulation process in order to better understand how policy makers interact with different projects when framing policies. The analysis is based on secondary sources, such as the minutes of inter-ministerial meetings, and interviews with ministers, executive secretaries and advisers involved in the process, as well as on semi-structured interviews with five key actors 6 . The method of content analysis proposed by Lopés-Aranguren (2000) was adopted to analyse interviews, so as to combine descriptive goals and inferences.
Interviewees were selected so as to represent groups with different politicaltechnical positions in charge of framing the PBF. Specifically, the analysis covers groups with opposite technical conceptions and solutions. Therefore, rival proposals to the same policy problem are the raw material of the analysis.
The decision-making process of the Bolsa Família program
The decision-making process of PBF can be summarized in four stages, as shown in Table 01 . proposal was to create a Food Card (Cartão Alimentação), considered as a first step to a broader food security program, including social control and local development (Trevisani et al., 2012, p. 504 According to Fonseca (2012) , the merger of the CCTs did not take place when Lula took office, because: Fonseca "proposed to take the cash transfer programs to the (MESA) minister. He does not agree with it, as he says his ministry was still starting its activities. He had a lot more power than me, a lot more. He sets up a new program be merged easily; their respective ministries were already discussing this possibility. He noticed that it would be difficult to merge such initiatives with the School Benefit (Bolsa Escola), since it had different eligibility criteria and timing. Further, he explained that there was consensus regarding some of the aspects of the proposal to merge the social policies, such as the single registration, minimum allowance, requirements to be linked to the family profile. However, he pointed that there was no consensus regarding how the new program would be carried out or managed.
In the sectorial meeting with the Ministry of Health on May 13, Minister
Humberto Silva talked about the need to understand the cash transfer policy differently from other social policies: while the first needs targeting, the latter must be universal and apply to all citizens. He expressed concern on health community agents being assigned to multiple roles. With these events having taken place before the fifth CPS meeting, the Technical Group aimed to build a consensus on a sole proposal for centralising cash transfer programs amongst the ministries participating in the CPS. MESA's proposal and the launching of MEC's new programs surprised the Technical Group. However, the ministries' negative reaction towards the termination/merging of their programs should not be surprising, since both individuals and organisations tend to design rational (limited) strategies to keep their programs, responsibilities and power, as argued by Crozier (1964) and Lindblom (1980) .
Even though such institutions realized that the merging of cash transfer policies could make these initiatives more rational and efficient, they did not agree with it, which confirms that the actions undertaken by each ministry were based on their own rational calculations and limited analyses. Since the Technical Group's proposal would no longer set food security (and the Zero Hunger Program) as a priority in the government agenda, MESA had one additional reason to oppose to the Technical Group's proposal.
Consequently, Takagi (2012) , a policy-maker working at MESA, evaluated the merger of the CCTs based on the impacts it would have on the Zero Hunger Programme:
The MESA agreed with the initiative (merging the CCT). It thought the merger would bring more rationality into play. On the other hand, it thought it would massively change the strategy for implementing the Zero __________________________________________________________________________________________ activities provide institutional and technical support to government's actions related to the formulation of public policies and development programs. 13 CAIXA stands for Caixa Econômica Federal, a public bank that is responsible for the operationalization of important national social programs, such as Bolsa Família.
Hunger Programme, since the key action taken in the first year (the Food Card -entry door to various other initiatives) would not be under the supervision of the Ministry anymore. But the Zero Hunger Programme was a lot broader than the Food Card (TAKAGI, 2012).
In other words, Takagi (2012) did not criticise clearly and technically the merger, as she agreed that it would make the program more rational. However, she made use of political claims to argue that such a decision was based on lack of knowledge of the Zero Hunger Program, for the Food Card was only one of its elements, although of pivotal importance.
The controversy among the ministries was solved by President Lula. He decided that the Working Group should proceed with the final proposal for integration of the cash transfer programs. The final proposal should be discussed with and agreed by other levels of government, particularly governors. This meeting was a landmark to the decision of merging the CCTs, as the discussion on MESA's and Working Group's opposing proposals came to an end.
Hence, it is clear that different groups made use of technical and political tools to achieve their goals. The MAPS Executive Secretariat made use of technical knowledge to leverage its proposal and promote the merger of the CCTs, on the grounds that such an outcome would facilitate the management of the policies to fight poverty. This demonstrates that MAPS had, at the same time, institutional and diffuse/selfless goals, which is also true for the MESA. However, one must draw a line between the MESA's and the MAPS' strategies; the proximity to and the relation based on trust that they have built with the president paradoxically gave more power to Minister Graziano, but these initial advantages seem to have undermined MESA's insertion in the games of power.
MESA only sought for political support and showed more flexibility towards its own proposal when there was no way back from the merger.
Formulating the Bolsa Família Program
The Working Group with experts from several government bodies was established in the June 12 meeting. It was in charge of consolidating a final merging proposal for the CCTs by July 28. To this end, the group was divided into four subgroups, with different responsibilities: -Technical Group: program design and the strategy for its implementation; -Registry Group: operational and technological elements of registration; high-level federal bureaucrats to conduct the unification of CCTs, working directly with the presidency 14 . This choice reflects the president's preference to work with a single group, instead of allowing different groups to dispute for influence in the political decision-making process. This stage was also marked by Ana Fonseca's return to the game of power, since she was invited to coordinate the work of this new team.
Even though the president had already ratified the general structure of PBF, there were still decisions to make regarding the details of the new program. The unification group was then empowered by the presidency to occupy spaces for negotiation with different governmental and international organizations. According to Fonseca (2012) , the unification group was responsible for conducting the negotiations with governors to commit fiscal resources to the program and with MEC and MS to define the conditionality involving these institutions. Similarly, in an interview, Cohn (2014) gives evidence of negotiation with international organizations:
It was very difficult to convince the World Bank representatives on the role of conditionalities (...). The World Bank proposals involved loans of a huge amount of money to assess and monitor the targeting (…) We worked hard to convince them on the understanding of conditionalities (…) Conditionalities were not for families; instead we intended to monitor the public policies implemented by the states, municipalities and the federal government. Our goal was not to take families out of PBF. Instead, as policy-makers find out that children are not attending school, we aimed that that municipalities would find out the reasons behind this absence. For us, condionalities have never been meant targeting! (COHN, 2014, p. ) .
By the end of December, the unification group managed to merge the register of beneficiaries in the previous CCT programs into one single database, Cadastro Único, and to finalize an agreement with subnational governments regarding the implementation of PBF, although this negotiated partnership did not generate the expected results at the time. According to Takagi (2006) , the fusion of these three organizations into one new [m]inistry, only two months later, was the probable and 'natural' upshot of all this institutional jugglery. However, its consequences, not all of them thought out deliberately, were deeper than the exchange of [three] [m]inisters in the social area (education, food security and social assistance) (TAKAGI, 2006, p. 161 ).
This author cites some of the aforementioned consequences, such as the redefinition of the Zero Hunger initiative from a program to a strategy that articulates a set of governmental actions in all spheres of the federation. Another consequence is a conceptual change involving the Mesa Program and the PBF. While the first was a programme concerning access to food, composed of different lines of action, the second was a cash-transfer programme aiming at providing minimal income along with conditionality.
Similarly, Aranha (2015) Consequently, the creation of MDS restored the game of power among these groups, but since there was a clear hierarchical structure, with a minister in a higher position than the secretaries, the degree of these conflicts diminished. For instance, Silva (2013) showed that the conflicts remained active in the MDS routines, especially in actions that demanded the internal coordination of middle-level federal bureaucracy. In Silva's interviews, MDS's staff told him it was easier to cooperate with external bureaucrats than with MDS' secretariats.
One characteristic of MDS that makes it different from the other ministries is the large number of "Public Managers" 16 occupying different positions in the institution, especially in SENARC. According to Silva (2013) and Aranha (2015) , it is possible to understand this recruitment as a strategy to strengthen the MDS administrative capacity. Although they did not have previous involvement with the proposal of the fight against poverty, the ministry managed to engage the "Public Managers" emotionally with this theme. Kadri (2012) 17 reinforces this interpretation:
Firstly, a very personal view... it might be strong, but working with the Bolsa Família Program is passionate. It is a wonderful feeling... Today's meeting may impact the lives of a quarter of the Brazilian population __________________________________________________________________________________________ 16 The federal government has a consolidated civil service career called "Expert in Public Policies and Government Management". They are commonly referred to as "Public Managers". Because of their high-level skills-they are recruited through a meritocratic and competitive selective process, must attend preparation courses, etc.-they are frequently recruited to high-level federal bureaucracy positions. 17 Nabil Kadri held a DAS position at the MDS, where he was responsible for improving the Single Registration (CadastroÚnico). He also worked for the Secretariat for Social Development of the State of São Paulo, in the social department of the National Bank on Socio-Economic Development (BNDES) and was back to the MDS during the first term of President Rousseff's government.
tomorrow and produce day-to-day outcomes, which are acknowledged by the IDB, World Bank or Brazilian researchers. Concrete outcomes in people's lives with academic results as well (KADRI, 2012). Kadri's statement (2012) , as well as other interviewees', reflected their deep involvement with their field of work. Two of them have specifically used words derived from the word "passion", whilst one has described their involvement as being moderate.
The word "passion" (and related words) means deep emotional involvement, which is unknown to the ethos of the classical definition of bureaucracy. Thus, this attitude is completely opposed to the obedience to formal rules that classically defined the bureaucrats, and it approaches the field of politics, which facilitates innovation.
Consequently, it illustrates the possibility of politicization of the bureaucracy, as argued by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) .
On the other hand, the idea of "passion" among high-level federal bureaucracy also helps to explain the defensive attitude towards change. The sum of technical content with emotional and political involvement supports the existence of more reactive behavior when faced by alternative proposals.
Conclusion
This case study confirms that policy-makers, be they appointed ones or bureaucrats, organize themselves around different technical and political projects, acting to leverage their influence on the decision-making process.
The PBF decision-making process was marked by conflict, tensions and nonlinearity. Such conflicts entailed games of power and competition of analysis, as stated by Lindblom (1980) , the fight of ministries and their federal high-level advisers strategies to resist the creation of a new program being the clearest evidence. Groups within the policy community in charge of formulating President Lula's social policy designed rational strategies in a context of limited rationality to maintain or improve their influence. That is to say, given the possibility of losing space, resources and responsibilities attached to social programs, they organized themselves to leverage their own authority, on the grounds of efficacy reasons.
The political defense of projects was grounded on technical arguments, so as to demonstrate the superiority of each own proposal along with the weaknesses of rival ones. This pattern was observed initially in the Working Group with the use of technical High-level Federal Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation: arguments to get support inside the presidential cabinet, and, after the decision to merge the CCTs, with the exposition of technical arguments and projects to the press as a last resort.
Groups' resistance and competition were solved by a visible actor, President Lula, when creating the small Working Group, who eventually achieved the presidential aspiration of merging cash transfer programs into one body. As a result, all sectorial ministries lose, since they would no longer be able to design and implement CCTs.
Of course, only more studies-extended to other policies and cases-will give support to the conclusions reached in this case study. However, our conclusions can act as reference points for future studies that will contribute to the knowledge of decisionmaking processes in social policies.
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